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WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS BY A
FOREIGN CORPORATION?
By WILLIAM J. KINNALLY
In discussing the subject of what constitutes doing business
by a foreign corporation, it is imperative that it first be shown
why such a dissertation is pertinent and significant in the field
of law and legal research.
It is manifest that whenever a corporation, acting through
its officers or agents, purports or intends to transact business,
and in other ways exercises the functions for which it was
organized, there must be applied to such transactions a new
set of regulations or rules which are predicated upon statutory
enactments or the rule of comity among the several states.
In such a manner the state is able to control (within the
confines of its own boundaries) the status, rights, powers and
liabilities of the foreign corporation.
While it is true that the legal existence, domicile, and
citizenship of a corporation can be only in the state of its
inception and creation, yet the ukase of Chief Justice Taney
that "it must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot
migrate to another sovereignty," 1 cannot be accepted as the
determining principle applicable to all foreign corporations
relative to their doing business outside the domestic state (the
one of its creation). Exercising prerogatives analogous to
those of a natural person, the corporation, through its agents,
may contract and transact business in jurisdictions other than
that of its inception. To construe Chief Justice Taney's
statement in such a way as to make it applicable to the modern
law of corporations, it might be said that while a corporation
may transgress the boundaries of the state of its creation and
migrate to another jurisdiction, yet it is constantly subject to
the control of the former state, being unable to disregard the
limitations and restrictions placed upon it by its charter.
1 Augusta Bank v. Earle (1839), 13 Pet. 519, 10 U. S. (L. Ed.) 274.
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While there might be confusion existing relative to the
control states may exercise over foreign corporations, yet a
consideration of the primary reason why suits should be
permitted to be prosecuted against such corporations will tend
to alleviate the situation. Since it appears to be only just and
reasonable that these corporations should be subject to suits
in places where they voluntarily do business, jurisdiction
should obtain only where it is just and reasonable that the
corporations should be held accountable.
Apropos to this phase of the question, it is requisite that
the particular cause of action involved should be examined. It
is apparent that corporations entering a state to conduct
business therein can reasonably and justly be subjected to the
forum of the particular jurisdiction relative to controversies
resulting from business done therein; persons dealing with
such corporations should not be forced to subject the dispute
to adjudication by a foreign tribunal. But it must also be
remembered that the mere fact that a corporation conducts
a small part of its business in a foreign state is not conclusively
indicative that it should be, ipso facto, subject to suits in that
state, since expense and inconvenience would result of necessity
from producing for trial witnesses and officials of the cor-
poration. 2
The courts have resorted to various and sundry fictions and
theories upon which they have predicated a state's power and
control over a foreign corporation. The earliest of these
theories, the "consent" theory, devolved upon the proposition
that since a state may either exclude or admit a foreign cor-
poration for the purpose of transacting business therein, it
was empowered to prescribe conditions of admission to which
the corporation must submit before it could do business. It
was believed that consent by the corporation to the application
of the law of that particular forum was implied from the very
fact that the corporation voluntarily engaged in activities in
the jurisdiction.
The "presence" theory was later resorted to, under which
it was believed that jurisdiction may obtain only when the
2 29 Col. L. R. 187 (1929).
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corporation is in such a position as would indicate its presence
within the state. It is submitted here that it is just as difficult
to determine whether the corporation is "present" as it is to
determine whether or not it was "doing business." It is
apparent that a foreign corporation can be called "present,"
if at all, whenever its agent is within the jurisdiction upon a
corporate mission. The conception that a corporation by
coming into a state is thereby rendered amenable to the
reasonable police power of the state, is supported by the
"reasonable exercise of jurisdiction" or "submission" theory.3
It has been stated that, "In the last analysis it seems that a
theory which takes into account the constitutional limitations
and restraints upon the 'unlimited' power of a state over a
foreign corporation must be based upon broad concepts of
public necessity and convenience which render the exercise of
judicial authority over a foreign corporation reasonable when
its activity begins to have an important influence upon the
residents, and of the theories proposed the 'reasonable regu:.
lation' basis seems to be the most realistic and the best adapted
to withstand continuous attack. ' 4
As pointed out in a recent case, 5 "doing business" has a
legal signification which differs with the particular type of case
to which it might, be applied. It is possible for a foreign
corporation to be held to be doing business in a given state
for one purpose, and not doing business for another purpose.
Consequently, in this treatise, the three general classes of
cases which involve doing business must be distinguished:
(1) those involving service of process upon a foreign cor-
poration; (2) those involving taxation; and (3) those involv-
ing domestication or qualification under statutes regulatory of
foreign corporations. The primary concern of many of the
cases of the second and third classes is the nature and character
of the business done, i. e., whether the business is interstate
and thus beyond the power of the state to tax or regulate.
3 Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising From Service of Process on Foreign
Corporation," (1935), 19 Minn. L. R. 375.
4 Ibid., p. 378.
5 Tignor v. L. G. Balfour & Co. (1936), - Va. App. -, 187 S. E. 648.
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Doing business as such is determinable by legal tests which
differ as the cases fall within one or the other of these three
classifications; thus, precedents appropriate for one class are
of little value when it is sought to apply them to another class.
In a discussion relative to the control a state may exercise
over a foreign corporation, it must be kept well in mind that
a corporation, in the eyes of the law, is a legal entity, a
juristic person, so to speak. In the evolution of our modern
corporate structure, it is interesting to perceive the early
conceptions of the corporation, if it could then be denominated
such.
In 1429 an action was prosecuted against the Commonalty
of Ipswich and a man named Jabe; the defense propounded
was that Jabe was a member of the Commonalty, and conse-
quently was being named twice as defendant in the same action;
so that if the defendants were found guilty of the charges
alleged, Jabe would be charged not once, but twice; with the
result that if the Commonalty were found guilty but Jabe was
found not guilty, the inevitable conclusion would be that Jabe
was both guilty and not guilty. This case is illustrative of a
failure to recognize the personality of the Commonalty, and
the failure to distinguish Jabe as a private individual from
Jabe as a member of the Commonalty. 6
It is submitted that it was not until toward the end of the
Roman Republic that the conception of a collective, juristic
person, as a possible subject of private rights, was developed;
and this was in the form of that which we now call a public
corporation, exercising governmental functions.
The features of the Roman juristic person are worthy of
comment at this point. Three natural persons were required
to form it; a majority was required to bind it; there had to be
an agent to act for it, so that it could sue and be sued; its
existence continued regardless of change among members;
and it could acquire, hold and dispose of property, as dis-
tinguished from that of its members.7 It is readily seen that
here we have the origin of our modern corporate structure.
0 Bryant Smith, "Legal Personality," (1928), 37 Yale L. J. 283, 290.
7 Lobingier, "Corporate Origins," (1937), 13 Tulane L. R. 41, 59.
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The English corporations, in the thirteenth century, were
either ecclesiastical or temporal, the former being more con-
spicuous and important because they included not only the
churches and the abbeys, but also "groups of secular ecclesi-
astics, which were corporations aggregate not subject to the
monarchial rule of an abbott," and possessed "personality."
In the eighteenth century the corporation was actually a
franchise, the limited liability of stockholders being the salient
characteristic. Containing all of the arrangements, the charter
was a contract between the state and the "corporation,"
between the stockholders and the "corporation," and between
the stockholders themselves."
Special charters were granted corporations in the early days
of the United States, whereby the control of the state and
the agreement contained therein sought to protect the interests
of the public, creditors and shareholders. With the advent
in 1837 of the general corporation laws in Connecticut, cor-
porations were permitted to engage in any lawful business,
and the strict supervision previously exercised by the state
over corporate activities, through the legislature, was left in
the hands of the secretary of state. The charters came to be
drafted only by the incorporators and their attorneys, the
contents and provisions thereof being known only to the clerks
and incorporators.9
The contemporaneous legal conception of a corporation
is that it is a real though artificial person, being substituted for
the persons who obtained its creation, owning and disposing of
its own property, and performing corporate acts in its cor-
porate name through officers and agents. While it is true that
the corporation as a legal entity exists separate and apart
from the persons composing it, yet this conception may be
disregarded by the courts if it is invoked in support of an end
subversive to public policy or to lawful action;1O nor can an
individual acting under the guise of a corporation organized
8 Willis, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (1936), p. 858.
9 Ibid.
10 Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder (1935), 79 F. (2) 263, 103 A. L. R.
FOREIGN CORPORATION
for that purpose, evade liability under his personal and
individual contract.
It is significant to note here that as concerns property rights,
a private corporation is a "person" within the meaning of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, which provide that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Nor
can a corporation be deprived, by a state, of equal protection
of the laws. While a corporation is not a "citizen" within
Article 4, Section 2, of the United States Constitution (which
provides that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states"),
yet for jurisdictional purposes a corporation is regarded as a
"citizen" of the state of its creation within Article 3, Section 2,
of the Constitution, which confers jurisdiction in cases "be-
tween citizens of different states" on the federal courts.
In discussing the question of state control over foreign
corporations, it must be kept in mind that while the state has
power to exclude them entirely or to prescribe the terms and
conditions of admission to do business in the state, yet when
such foreign corporation is engaged in interstate commerce its
business pertaining thereto is protected from state regulation.
Many commercial activities were removed from the realm of
state control when the federal government took "commerce"
under its exclusive protection. Thus it has been said: "To
carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege
granted by the State; it is a right which every citizen of the
United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution
and laws of the United States; and the accession of mere
corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on
their business, cannot have the effect of depriving them of
such right, unless Congress should see fit to interpose some
contrary regulation on the subject."'" Consonant with this
statement is the idea that there is in such a situation no
discrimination made between the corporation and the individual
as concerns the business carried on by one or the other. While
interstate commerce is protected by the commerce clause of
11 Crutcher v. Kentucky (1890), 141 U. S. 47, 57, 11 S. Crt. 851.
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the Constitution, yet in order that such protection may obtain,
it is first necessary to determine that business is actually being
transacted, for until such determination there can be no
commerce to be protected on the ground of being interstate.' 2
One authority submits the proposition that a corporation is
entitled to protection against legislation after it has been
admitted to do business, including due process, respect for the
obligation of contracts, and equal protection of the laws.13
A state cannot, in imposing conditions on the corporation as a
prerequisite to admission, require that the corporate rights
secured by the Constitution of the United States be infringed
or violated. 14  A succinct statement of corporate rights is
found in Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co.:15 "The
Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress in
pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land. Under
that Constitution and those laws a corporation of one state
has at least three absolute rights which it may freely exercise
in every other state in the Union, without let or hindrance
from its legislation, or action: (1) Every corporation,
empowered to engage in interstate commerce by the state in
which it is created, may carry on interstate commerce in every
state in the Union, free of every prohibition and condition
imposed by the latter. * * * (2) Every corporation of
any state in the employ of the United States has the right to
exercise the necessary corporate powers and to transact the
business requisite to discharge the duties of that employment
in every other state in the Union without permission granted,
or conditions imposed by the latter. * * * (3) Every
corporation of each state has the absolute right to institute
and maintain in the federal courts, and to remove to those
courts for trial and decision, its suits in every other state, in
the cases and on the terms prescribed by the acts of Congress.
* * * Every law of a state which attempts to destroy
these rights or to burden their exercise is violative of the
Constitution of the United States and void."
12 Isaacs, "An Analysis of Doing Business," (1925), 25 Col. L. R. 1018.
13 Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, Vol 17, p. 240, Sec. 8390.
14 King Tonopah Min. Co. v. Lynch (1916), 232 Fed. 485.
15 (1907), 156 Fed. 1, 15.
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Although a state may exclude a foreign corporation from
admission, yet once such corporation is admitted to do business
it is entitled to the same rights and protection as are domestic
corporations.
While "doing business" of itself is a generic term, there
are in fact various degrees of doing business, which are dis-
tinguishable by a differentiation predicated upon three legal
purposes. "The least degree is that which will permit service
of process in a suit against a foreign corporation. For this the
business done must be of such a character as to warrant the
inference that the corporation is present in the jurisdiction
where service is attempted. A higher degree is necessary to
subject such a corporation to a tax on its activity, namely,
continued efforts in the pursuit of profit and gain, and such
activities as are essential to these purposes. A still higher
degree is the standard for the application of statutes requiring
qualification in the state, as where the activities of the corpora-
tion indicate a purpose to regularly transact business.' ' 16
The distinction between the business activities of a foreign
corporation which render it amenable to service of process and
those which require qualification in the state, was appreciated
in Knutson et al. v. Campbell River Mills, Ltd.,17 wherein it
was said: "Residence of an officer in his individual relation
of itself does not give a corporation domiciliary status
* * * 'Doing business,' to bring an alien corporation
within the jurisdiction of the local courts, does not mean that
the corporation must maintain such a relation to 'doing busi-
ness' in the state as to bring it within the statutory provision
requiring a license for such operation." Relative to the
service of process, the tendency of the courts has been to
interpret "doing business" in its broader sense, and to adopt a
narrow standard as to the volume of business necessary to
bring the corporation within the meaning of the term. It is
submitted that it would be unreasonable and impracticable to
hold that only the highest degree of doing business should be
taken as the amount requisite for all legal purposes, and the
16 Supra, footnote 12, p. 1024.
17 (1924), 300 Fed. 241, 242.
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mere fact that a corporation is not doing sufficient business to
require it to register or appoint an agent for service of process
should not relieve it from service of process.
In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.' the court recognized
the differentiation between the degrees of doing business
which were requisite for the purposes of taxation and of
qualification when it said: "But a much broader meaning is said
to be given to the words 'doing business' when used in a tax
statute than is given to them when used in a statute which
forbids a foreign corporation to do business in a state until
it has complied with the conditions which the statute imposes."
While there is no exact and precise test of the nature or
extent of the business which must be done relative to the
question of service of process and the jurisdiction of local
courts, suffice it to say that enough business must be transacted
to indicate that the corporation is "present" in the state.
Immunity from local jurisdiction, however, is not obtained
from the mere fact that the business involved is interstate in
character when considered as a whole. The case of Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky'9 presented the question
of the sufficiency of the service of process on an alleged agent
of the Company in a criminal proceeding in the local court of
a county in which an indictment had been returned against the
Company for alleged violations of the anti-trust laws of the
State of Kentucky. The Harvester Company appeared and
moved to quash the return, principally upon the ground that
service had not been made upon an authorized agent of the
Company and that the Company was not doing business
within the State of Kentucky; it was contended that any action
under the attempted service would violate the due process and
commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. In an
affirmation of the finding by the State court that the service
of process was such as would sustain the judgment, the
Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.
Justice Day, said: "We are satisfied that the presence of a
corporation within a State necessary to the service of process
18 (1914), 216 Fed. 83, 88.
19 (1914), 234 U. S. 579, 589, 34- S. Crt. 944.
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is shown when it appears that the corporation is there carrying
on business in such sense as to manifest its presence within the
State, although the business transacted may be entirely inter-
state in its character. In other words, this fact alone does not
render the corporation immune from the ordinary process of
the courts of the State."
It has been stated that: "The business which must be
transacted by a foreign corporation to permit service of
process must be such as to warrant the inference that the
corporation is present. To subject such a corporation to
taxation for doing business, the transactions must not only
show that the corporation is present but also that it is active.
In order that qualification be rendered necessary, the corpora-
tion must not only be present and active, but its activity must
be coltinuOuS."120
It is generally found that when the terms and conditions
upon which foreign corporations shall be admitted to do
business in a state are prescribed, there is neither a definition
of the particular term employed nor a specification of the
particular acts or transactions which fall within that term.
Unless there is such a definition or specification, the question
resolves itself into one of fact which requires judicial deter-
mination. Since the rule of jury cases in general are applicable
to the ultimate determination of the problem, unless the
evidence is so conflicting as to permit reasonable minds to draw
different conclusions therefrom the question is one of law for
the court alone. There must be a consideration of every
circumstance and all the combined acts of the foreign corpora-
tion in the particular state, in order to arrive at a conclusion
that the corporation purports to engage in some part of its
regular business in the state. 2 . It has been held that payment
by a foreign corporation of a state privilege tax while per-
forming a single contract within the state, was not of itself
such a conclusive indication of an intention to carry on business
in the state as would subject it to local regulatory statutes. 22
20 Supra, footnote 12, p. 1045.
21 Supra, footnote 13, p. 466, Sec. 8464.
22 Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. E. W. Minter Co., Inc. (1927), 156 Tenn.
19, 300 S. W. 574.
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In considering the various elements and aspects involved in
the question at hand, it cannot be said that the length of time
a foreign corporation is in a state, or the volume of business it
does therein, is determinative. Rather, the character of the
business and the purposes for which the corporation entered
the state are to be given the greater weight and credence.
Thus it was stated in Adjustment Bureau, etc. v. Conley :23
"It is not the length of time that a foreign corporation is here,
nor the volume of business done while here,-it is the purpose
for which it comes that determines whether compliance with
the statute is necessary."
Next in order will be discussed the various forms and phases
of doing business by a foreign corporation, and the judicial
determinations as to whether or not local jurisdiction should
be applicable to such corporation.
It seems to be the general rule that engaging in litigation
does not constitute doing business, assuming that the latter
term is understood as being a portion of the ordinary business
of the corporation, as distinguished from single, isolated acts.
In the case of Comstock v. Droney Lumber Co.24 it was stated
by the court that: "The power to sue and make defense is
incident to property and contract rights and the exercise
thereof the vindication of such rights, and though attendant
upon or included in the corporate franchise, the exercise of
such power does not amount to a prosecution of corporate
business in the ordinary sense of the term. Its continuance,
after the right to do business or exercise the ordinary corporate
powers has ceased, is necessary to the preservation of rights
lawfully acquired and which the legislature cannot be deemed
to have intended to destroy or leave unprotected by denying
or withholding it."
The fact that the corporation is prosecuting the action to
protect or gain possession of property does not affect or alter
the general rule. The courts are in accord in holding invalid
a service of process made upon an agent of a foreign corpora-
tion who comes into the state's jurisdiction solely for the
23 (1927), 44 Idaho 148, 153, 255 Pac. 414.
24 (1911), 69 W, Va. 100, 103, 71 S. E, 255,
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purpose of settling a claim or dispute which did not arise
from business transacted in that jurisdiction.25 This is an
equitable and just legal principle, since the alleged cause of
action does not accrue as a result of the agent's entering the
jurisdiction to settle the dispute.
In a treatment of the subject of ownership, acquisition and
disposition of property in a state by a foreign corporation,
it is requisite that the various phases and aspects of such
subject be discussed individually.
When the corporation acquires real estate in another state
for the purpose of pursuing its corporate objectives and as a
part of its regular business, it is apparent that this acquisition
can be denominated "doing business." In Greene v. Kentenia
Corp.26 a Virginia corporation invested its capital in many
thousands of acres of coal and timber land situated in Ken-
tucky; the land was not used for mining, lumber or agricultural
purposes, or otherwise. Nevertheless, it was held that the
corporation was liable for the payment of a license tax for
the privilege of engaging in business in Kentucky. It was said
by the court: "When plaintiff invested its capital in the coal
and timber land which it purchased in this state, it did so for
one of two purposes-that of speculation by holding the land
until it naturally increased in price, or to reap a profit from
it by operating it either in the way of cultivation, mining,
getting timber from it or otherwise, so as to make it profitable.
It avers in its pleading that it is doing neither of the latter,
and therefore it is not doing business in this state. But,
according to our conception, the land need not be in actual
use in order to constitute doing business. * * * One of
the definitions of 'invest,' as given by Mr. Webster, is 'to
lay out (money or capital) in business with the view of
obtaining income or profit,' and to employ capital by investing
it in land and not using the land is, according to our view,
doing business. * * * As seen, plaintiff employed its
capital by investing it in real estate situated within this state.
26 Henry M. Day & Co. v. Schiff, Lang & Co. (1921), 278 Fed. 533; Hoyt v.
Ogden Portland Cement Co., (1911), 185 Fed. 889.
26 (1917), 175 Ky. 661, 669, 194 S. W. 820.
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It then put its capital in motion, and as long as it remains so
invested it is doing business for its owner."
However, the confusion arises when the corporation ac-
quires, or receives, real estate only as an incident to its regular
business practices and purposes. It cannot be said that a
corporation is doing business within a state when, with no
intent to pursue the ordinary corporate functions, a casual act
or transaction happens to involve real estate in that state.
The case of Foore v. Simon Piano Co. 27 pertained to a
situation wherein a foreign corporation, engaged in selling
automatic music machines in the state, obtained a default
judgment against a debtor, and execution was levied on the
latter's land-this was bid in by the corporation at the sheriff's
sale. In holding inapplicable the statute prohibiting a foreign
corporation "doing business in this state" without first filing
its articles of incorporation and designating an agent, the court
said: "The mere purchase at execution sale of real property
in satisfaction of a judgment procured on an interstate trans-
action is not in itself 'doing business in this state.' * * *
The legislature has not undertaken to prohibit a corporation
engaged in interstate business from taking title under judicial
process in the collection of a debt where the corporation was
not otherwise 'doing business' in this state within the meaning
of the constitution and statute."
It is apparent that if the sale of real estate is a portion of
the business for which the corporation was organized, such
disposition, or the taking of various steps to effect a disposi-
tion, would constitute doing business.
The requirements of doing business are not fulfilled by a
foreign corporation when it participates in the mere purchase
or acquisition of personal property. This rule prevails even
where it is contemplated, as a part of the contract, that the
articles are to be shipped out of the state.2 8 However, it has
been held that there were elements and factors such as would
constitute doing business in a case where a foreign corporation
that had purchased standing timber moved a camping outfit
27 (1910), 18 Idaho 167, 178, 108 Pac. 1038.
28 Supra, footnote 13, p. 523, Sec. 8485.
532
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into the state and hired laborers to cut the timber. 29 It is
submitted that the court was undoubtedly influenced by the
fact that the transaction entailed, in addition to the shipment
of the timber, the operations necessary to cut it.
Consonant with the principles applicable to realty and the
purchase of personalty, the sale of goods by a foreign cor-
poration, pursuant to its regular course of business in the
local state, will constitute doing business therein. While it
is true that a state cannot burden interstate commerce, yet
if in addition to the interstate transportation of the goods
the corporation performs within the state acts of a purely
local character which are non-essential to the consumma-
tion of the ultimate sales and delivery of the goods, such
corporation can be said to be doing business within the state.
This principle was applied in a case where an Illinois corpora-
tion sold shrubs and trees to a Wisconsin resident, the former
agreeing to plant them as directed by a landscape architect;
it was held that the planting of the shrubs and trees consti-
tuted a business wholly separate from interstate commerce,
being a purely local act after the cessation of interstate
commerce.
3 0
The courts are, as a whole, in accord with the principle that
there is no doing of business when a foreign corporation owns
stock in a domestic corporation, even though it is a controlling
interest, provided, of course, that the latter corporation is
responsible for its own contracts, and has its own property and
officers. One qualification of this statement is that if the
ownership of the stock and control of the domestic corporation
form one of the direct purposes for the existence of the foreign
corporation, the latter will be held to be doing business in the
state of the former.31 The general rule is followed by the
courts when the entities of the two corporations remain
separate and distinct; but when the one corporation is organ-
ized only to hold the stock of and control the other, the
domestic corporation in reality becomes the alter ego or agent
29 E. L. Bruce Co. v. Hannon (1926), Tex. Civ. App., 283 S. V. 862.
30 Phoenix Nursery Co. v. Trostel (1917), 166 Wis. 215, 164 N. W. 995.
31 Bankers' Holding Corp. v. Maybury (1931), 161 Wash. 681, 297 Pac. 740.
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of the foreign holding company. However, the power of the
latter to elect the directors of the other corporation, and thus
dictate the election of officers and the determination of policy,
will not of itself produce such a relation as to make the acts of
the domestic corporation those of the holding company.32
Having treated the subject of the ownership of stock, it will
be apposite at this time to determine the judicial attitude
toward stock subscriptions, i. e., whether the transactions
involving stock subscriptions constitute doing business.
Generally it is held that constitutional and statutory pro-
visions regulating the transacting of, or the doing of, business
do not apply to a foreign corporation that is soliciting sub-
scriptions of its capital stock within the state; nor does the
acceptance therein by the corporation affect this rule. This
principle is predicated upon the conception that the ordinary
business for which the corporation is organized does not in-
clude such contracts or transactions. Thus, in First Nat. Bank
v. Leeper,33 the court said: "The business of the corporation
here involved was that of a telegraph and telephone company.
That is a well known business, and the prosecution of such
business does not consist in selling some of its stock to an
individual. Such a transaction or such transactions, it is true,
may occur, but they are not the usual, or customary, or ordinary
business of a telegraph, or telephone company, nor is such a
corporation organized for the transaction of such business."
It has been held, 34 also, that where a contract of a subscription
agreement is signed in one state, and is subject to the approval
of the home office in another state, the foreign corporation is
not doing business in the former; the court, quoting from
another case, stated: "In harmony with this basic doctrine are
the adjudications in this state that when an order is signed by
the vendee in this state, and then transmitted to the foreign
corporation in another state, for acceptance or rejection, and
is there accepted, the contract by such act is consummated in
the foreign state."
32 75 A. L. R. 1242, 1243.
33 (1906), 121 Mo. App. 688, 693, 97 S. W. 636.
34 (1933), 112 N. J. L. 304, 306, 170 Atl. 619.
FOREIGN CORPORATION
Two manifest exceptions to the general rule above stated
are applied in cases where the sale of the stock, or the
procuring of subscriptions therefor, is the business for which
the corporation was organized; and where the sale of the
stock cannot be considered as preliminary to the prosecution
of the corporate business.35
Keeping in mind the principle that interstate commerce is
immune from transgression or burdens imposed by the states,
and that the local business of a foreign corporation may be
regulated by the states, the question of whether or not soliciting
by agents constitutes doing business will be approached. In
connection with this, it may be said that the courts do not
distinguish between sales made by soliciting agents to dealers
and those made to the consumers themselves. The agents
stand before the law exactly as their principals would stand
if they came on the same mission, and if one can be taxed or
regulated, the other can, also.
While it has heretofore been held generally that the mere
soliciting of business by the agents of a foreign corporation
cannot be denominated "doing business," yet the judicial
tendency has been to consider such agents as the representatives
of their corporation, particularly with reference to the service
of process. Where there is a continuous course of business
carried on in the state, resulting from solicitations of orders
within the state and the shipment thereto of goods from the
state where the orders were accepted, it must be held that
there is a doing of business in the former state." Of course,
it must be remembered that at no time can the states impose
a burden upon interstate commerce. Thus in Dakota Photo
Engraving Co. v. Foodland7 a foreign corporation solicited
orders in the state through a traveling representative, and then
shipped the goods so ordered to the purchasers from outside
the state. It was held that shipping merchandise from one
state to another upon such orders constituted interstate com-
merce, and that the foreign corporation was not subject to
35 35 A. L R. 625, 633.
36 Supra, footnote 19.
87 (1932), 59 S. D. 523, 241 N. W. 510.
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conditions imposed by the local state as a prerequisite to its
transacting business within the state.
The fact that the agent collects the purchase price of the
goods sold in the state does not seem to change the general
rule as to the interstate character of the transaction, nor
does it amount to doing business.38 While it is usually held
that there is no doing of business within the state even when
the goods are shipped into the state to the agent, who delivers
them to the purchaser himself, yet in a case 39 where a foreign
corporation shipped goods in carload lots from its home office,
in one state, to its agent in Tennessee, who stored them in a
warehouse to be distributed on orders he obtained within
Tennessee, the court stated: "These facts show plaintiff was
engaged in doing business in Tennessee, and that the business
done with defendant was intrastate business, thus subjecting
the plaintiff to the provisions of the Tennessee statute."
It is submitted that the facts of each particular case must
be analyzed in order to determine whether or not any control
or regulation by the local state would impinge upon the sanctity
of interstate commerce.
One court4" succinctly stated that: "A soliciting agent, in
this state, for a foreign corporation, may maintain an office
or place of business on which the name of such corporation
appears on the doors and windows, of such place, without
making the corporation amenable to service of process; but if
an essential corporate function, even though slight, is delegated
to such agent, or if such agent, with the permission of the
corporation, exercises such authority at such office or place
of business, then the corporation is amenable to process served
upon such agent."
While the maintenance of a local office in the state by a
foreign corporation is of some significance relative to a deter-
mination of whether or not the corporation is doing business
therein, such maintenance of itself is not all-conclusive. It is
38 Gen. Excavator Co. v. Emory (1931), - Mo. App. -, 40 S. W. (2) 490.
39 Midland Linseed Product Co. v. Warren Bros. Co. (1925), 46 F. (2) 870,
872.
40 Supra, footnote 5, p. 472.
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necessary to consider the character and purpose of the office,
and the use to which it is put. Thus, in Neely v. Philadelphia
Inquirer Co.41 a foreign newspaper corporation maintained
correspondents in Washington, D. C., for the collection of
news, such correspondents having only the duty and authority
as would be directly and necessarily incidental to the gathering
of news and the transmission of it to the main office of their
newspaper. The rent for the rooms occupied by the cor-
respondents and other expenses were paid by the corporation,
and its name appeared on the door and in the telephone book
as the tenant. It was held by the court that the corporation
was not doing business in Washington, judge Hitz stating
that: "* * * each case is to be considered and decided
upon its own facts and circumstances, though in a general way
it may be said that the business done must be of such character
and extent as to warrant the inference that the foreign cor-
poration is present by its agent in the jurisdiction of the
process, and has thereby subjected itself to the laws of that
jurisdiction. So a foreign corporation may be doing business
of a certain kind to a considerable extent, actually and obvi-
ously, and yet not be subject to such a statute, if its activities
go no further than solicitation, though somewhat elaborately
organized and advertised. * * * While if its activities
include not only solicitation but the fulfillment thereof by
shipment of goods and receipt of payments, the statute shall
apply."
It is submitted that the court was no doubt influenced by
the fact that the collection and dissemination of news from
Washington is so significant and important, nationally, that
to hold such transactions to constitute doing business would
be transgressing the confines of the legislative intent of the
statute involved.
It seems to be generally held that the mere solicitation of
passenger or freight traffic by a foreign railroad corporation,
even though a local office is maintained, does not constitute
doing business, where the solicitors have no authority to
contract in such a way as to bind the corporation or to receive
41 (1932), 62 Fed. (2) 873, $74.
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and collect money for transportation.42 While some courts
have held that soliciting traffic within the state would permit
the jurisdiction of that state to obtain, the courts in such cases
considering factors such as discretionary powers of the agents
to transact other business, the nature and character of the
local office, method of payment, etc.; yet other decisions have
held contra, presumably upon the ground that the solicitation
was a mere incident of interstate commerce, the foreign
corporation being considered as not actually doing business
but merely attempting to secure business that would actually
be done elsewhere. It is pertinent to say again that the facts
of each particular case must be analyzed in order to determine
whether or not there is a doing of business. If state regulation
would impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce,
it is conceded that the courts would be in accord in holding
that the states' jurisdiction would not obtain. It has been
stated by one authority43 that: "* * * it may be stated
without fear of contradiction that if the statutes are broad
enough, while a foreign railway corporation which is engaged
solely in soliciting business within the state for its lines without
the state, and not making contracts of shipment within the
state, or doing other local business, is not subject to service
of process within the state, since it is not doing business within
the state within the requirement of the due process clause of
the 14th Amendment; * * * if the soliciting agency
goes beyond those things necessarily appertaining to the
business of a soliciting agency, such as the issuing of bills of
lading, settling claims, etc., it is doing business there and is
amenable to the process of the courts * * * unless to
subject the corporation to suit in a particular case works an
unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce * * *."
Courts are in accord in holding that when a foreign cor-
poration advertises or solicits advertisements in another state
there is no doing of business. In Krakowski v. W~hite Sulphur
Springs, Inc.44 it was held that a foreign corporation organized
42 Supra, footnote 13, p. 547, Sec. 8497.
43 46 A. L. R. 570, 589.
44 (1916), 174 App. Div. 440, 441, 161 N. Y. Supp. 19S.
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to conduct a hotel in another state was not engaged in doing
business in the latter state merely because it advertised its
business there, the court saying: "The business of advertising
and getting custom, however, is a mere incident to the operation
of a hotel and health resort, and is not a substantive part of
the primary business for which the defendant was incorporated,
so that, in my judgment, the defendant is not doing business
within this State * * *" It has been held also that
where a foreign publishing corporation sends agents into
another state (where it circulates its periodicals by mail) for
the purpose of soliciting advertisements at rates prescribed by
the corporation, subject to the approval of the home office,
such corporation is not doing business in the local state.45
Relative to the execution of contracts by foreign corpora-
tions, the general rule is that the contracts made with residents
of the local state, to be performed outside the latter state, do
not constitute doing business, even if property located within
the local state is involved. The criteria are the place of
performance and the acts to be performed in the state pursuant
to the agreement. In order to permit jurisdiction of the
local state to apply, some other business of the corporation,
in addition to the contract involved, must be transacted.
Cooper lfg. Co. v. Ferguson46 was a case in which an
Ohio corporation, without filing the requisite certificate in
Colorado, contracted in the latter State to manufacture
machinery at its place of business in Ohio, and to deliver it
in Ohio; the corporation had no intent or purpose of doing
any other acts in Colorado. It was held that there was no
carrying on of business in Colorado. The court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Woods, said: "The Constitution requires
the foreign corporation to have one or more known places of
business in the State before doing any business therein. This
implies a purpose at least to do more than one act of business.
For a corporation that has done but a single act of business,
and purposes to do no more, cannot have one or more known
45 (1905), 123 Fed. 614.
46 (1885), 113 U. S. 727, 734, 5 S. Crt. 739.
47 (1924), 31 Wyo. 191, 224 Pac. 850.
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places of business in the State. To have known places of
business it must be carrying on or intending to carry on
business. * * * The making in Colorado of the one
contract sued on in this case, by which one party agreed to
build and deliver in Ohio certain machinery and the other party
to pay for it, did not constitute a carrying on of business in
Colorado. * * * To require such a certificate as a pre-
requisite to the doing of a single act of business when there
was no purpose to do any other business or have a place of
business in the State, would be unreasonable and incongruous."
As a corollary of the foregoing principle, the foreign
corporation will be considered to be doing business in the
local state when it transacts, under the particular contract, a
substantial part of the business for which it was created, and
this rule obtains even though the contract is entered into in
another state or in the domiciliary state of the corporation.
Although there have been cases holding to the contrary, it
has been held that there is no doing of business when a foreign
corporation contracts with the domestic state, or one of its
agencies, to facilitate the performance of a public duty imposed
upon such state or agency. In State v. American Book Co.,48
the Book Company had contracted with the state school-text-
book commission to supply the schools of the state with certain
text-books; after the Book Company had partially performed
its part of the contract, and was proceeding to a full discharge
thereunder, the state sought to cancel the contract. Among
other things the court said: "The matter of procuring a
corporation to supply needed books is purely a state affair;
no private right attaches to it. Nor is the act one of ordinary
trade or commerce, in which the state may divest itself of the
attributes of sovereignty and conduct itself as an individual
may do. The most distinctly sovereign prerogatives of the
legislature, under the Constitution, are enlisted and concerned.
Unable to attend to certain details of the work proposed, a
special agent was created, and clothed with such authority as
seemed necessary to accomplish the legislative design. The
state text-book commission is a public agency created to aid
48 (1904), 69 Kan. 1, 22, 76 Pac. 411.
FOREIGN CORPORATION
in the assertion of a public right and the execution of a public
power in the interest of the public welfare. Corporate power
is withheld from it; it possesses no prerogatives personal to
itself or its members, and the state alone can enforce the
contracts it may negotiate. It is merely the arm of the
legislature, and the character of the acts done by it cannot be
distinguished from the character of governmental acts per-
formed by the legislature itself."
The subject of insurance contracts presents an interesting
array of questions, even though it is controlled by the general
proposition that the foreign insurance corporation will be held
to be doing business in the local state only when it transacts
therein a substantial portion of the business for which it was
created. The case of Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha49 supports
the legal principle that when, through correspondence or other
means, a resident of the local state contracts with the foreign
insurance company in its domiciliary state, there is no doing
of business in the former state. In this particular case, the
applications for the policies were obtained in the local state
by agents of the corporation, and were then forwarded for
acceptance or rejection to the company at a place outside the
state. The court said: "The general rule is that a foreign
corporation is not doing business in a state by entering into
contracts with residents thereof, where the contracts are made
and are to be performed elsewhere, although the contracts
relate to property within the state; and where applications for
insurance are obtained in a state by an agent of a foreign
company, and forwarded by him for acceptance or rejection
to a company at a place outside of the state, the company is not
doing business in the state wherein the applicant resides by
accepting and issuing policies in pursuance thereof at such
outside office."
There is an apparent conflict of authorities concerning the
question of whether or not the collection of premiums under
existing policies constitutes doing business by the foreign
corporation after it has withdrawn from the state.
40 (1925), 13 Fed. (2) 500, 507.
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While some cases5" have held that there is still a doing of
business under such state of facts, yet others have held to the
contrary. Thus in State v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.51
a foreign insurance company ceased to solicit or take new
policies, and withdrew its agents from the local state, thus
compelling the payments of premiums to be made through
the mail and express. In permitting the company to evade
the payment of a privilege tax on gross premium receipts
imposed on all foreign insurance companies, and to keep alive
all of its old policies, the court stated: "We may admit that
the receipt of premiums is doing business, but when such
receipt is made in a foreign State it does not amount to doing
business in Tennessee, but in such foreign State. When the
premium is paid and the renewal made and completed in a
foreign State, we are unable to see how any business is done
in Tennessee. Neither the policy is renewed or continued, nor
is the money paid in Tennessee, but both are in the foreign
State. There is nothing done in Tennessee, no new business
done or solicited, no agent there and no agency, no contract
made, no money paid, no receipt for renewal given, and no
business done of any character. The postal and express
authorities are not the agents of the company, but of the
insured, as the company's policy stipulates that the premiums
shall be paid at the home or foreign office."
A view diametrically opposed to this is presented in Conn.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley,52 a case wherein the facts
were similar to those above set forth, supplemented with the
one additional fact that payment of the premium was made
directly to the agent residing in another State, who was once
the agent in the State where the policyholders resided. The
statement of the court was: "It cannot be said with truth, as
we think, that an insurance company does no business within
a State unless it have agents therein who are continuously
seeking new risks and it is continuing to issue new policies upon
50 (1917), 244 Fed. 863; (1919), 187 Iowa 507, 171 N. W. 711; (1899), 172
U. S. 602, 19 S. Crt. 308.
51 (1901), 106 Tenn. 282, 294, 61 S. W. 75.
52 (1899), 172 U. S. 602, 611, 19 S. Crt. 308.
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such risks. Having succeeded in taking risks in the State
through a number of years, it cannot be said to cease doing
business therein when it ceases to obtain or ask for new risks
or to issue new policies, while at the same time its old policies
continue in force and the premiums thereon are continuously
paid by the policyholders to an agent residing in another State,
and who was once the agent in the State where the policy-
holders resided. This action on the part of the company
constitutes doing business within the State, so far as is neces-
sary, within the meaning of the law upon the subject."
There are numerous situations and cases where a foreign
corporation enters an agreement to install fixtures or ma-
chinery, or to construct a building; and since it may never
again enter the state, after the particular job undertaken has
been completed, it does not choose to qualify to do business
in the state of performance. Can such a single act or trans-
action be held to constitute the doing of business, so that the
corporation is violating statutes requiring it to qualify before
it can carry on business in the local state?
It is apparent that in most cases where the foreign corpora-
tion is to do construction work, it must hire laborers and
sometimes rent equipment, purchase supplies and materials,
and carry on various other transactions, with the result that
such corporation can be said to be doing business in the state
of performance.
The line of demarcation is not so lucid or apparent when,
pursuant to a contract, the foreign corporation also agrees to
install the equipment purchased. It might be said that the
decisive question is not whether there is business being done,
but whether the contract is protected as being considered
interstate commerce. However, it cannot be baldly asserted
that there is interstate commerce merely because, in the per-
formance of the contract, material and labor are brought from
outside the state. When the foreign corporation both manu-
factures and installs the apparatus or equipment, the solution
of the problem devolves upon the question whether or not
there has been a termination of interstate commerce, i. e.,
whether the work and labor within the state, rather than the
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sale of the articles in interstate commerce, were involved; or
whether the installation of the articles was merely incidental
to the sale and delivery of such articles-in the former, the
protection of the commerce clause will not obtain, while in the
latter case it will.
One of the leading cases upon this question, wherein it was
held that the work and labor within the state, rather than the
interstate sale, were involved, is Browning v. Waycross.5A3
In this case an agent had solicited orders in the local state for
lightning rods manufactured by a non-resident; the rods were
then shipped to the agent, who erected them for the customer
without further charge, since the purchase price included such
service. It was held that such business of erecting the rods
was subject to a license tax, since it was not in interstate
commerce, and did not pertain either to delivery of the articles
shipped in interstate commerce or to the completion of an
interstate transaction-it was a purely local act performed
after the complete termination of interstate commerce.
The other side of the question, i. e., where the installation
of the article is merely incidental to the sale and delivery
pursuant to an interstate transaction, so as to be protected
by the commerce clause, is represented by the leading case of
York Mfg. Co. v. Colley.54 There the contract of sale of an
artificial ice plant by a foreign corporate vendor provided that
the latter was to furnish an engineer to assemble the equipment
at the point of destination, and before there could be a complete
delivery a practical efficiency test was to be made. The court
held that such provision was relevant and pertinent to the
consummation of the interstate sale, with the result that
payment of the purchase price could not be avoided on the
ground that the corporation was carrying on local business
without first having obtained the permit made requisite by
statute as a condition precedent to the right of bringing suit
in the local courts.
This case was followed in Jeolian Co. v. Fisher,55 which
53 (1914), 233 U. S. 16, 34 S. Crt. 578.
54 (1918), 247 U. S. 21, 38 S. Crt. 430, 11 A. L. R. 611.
55 (1930), 40 Fed. (2) 189.
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involved a contract by a foreign corporation to furnish and
install a pipe organ in another state; the court held that the
agreement to install was not only relevant and appropriate
to the interstate sale, but was essential if the organ, as
distinguished from its parts, was to be sold at all.
In a case following Browning v. Waycross, it was stated by
the court that: "The test is whether the business done in the
state of destination involves a 'question of the delivery of
property shipped in interstate commerce, or of the right to
complete an interstate commerce transaction,' or whether it
concerns 'merely the doing of a local act after interstate
commerce had completely terminated.' * * * In all cases
bearing upon the subject the distinction is carefully drawn
between situations requiring local work as essential to a
complete delivery in interstate commerce, because of the
peculiar nature of the subject-matter of the contract, and those
in which the local work done is inherently and intrinsically
intrastate." 5
Transactions by foreign theatrical or booking corporations
within another state are worthy of some consideration. It is
apparent that there is a doing of business when the foreign
company engages in some substantial portion of its corporate
business in the local state. In Interstate Amusement Co. v.
Albert et al.5 7 the plaintiff was an Illinois corporation, engaged
in booking actors to play in various theaters, receiving from
the theater owners a certain sum and commissions. For the
purpose of enlarging its business, plaintiff sent agents into
Tennessee, and made contracts with the theater owners, and
had had extensive correspondence with the other parties.
The particular contract involved in the instant case was finally
signed and accepted by the defendant in Tennessee. It was
held that this contract did not involve interstate commerce,
but that the plaintiff was doing business in Tennessee, and
consequently could not sue on the contract because of a failure
to comply with the pertinent statute.
56 (1934), Mandel Bros. v. Henry A. O'Neil, 69 F. (2) 452, 455.
57 (1913), 128 Tenn. 417, 161 S. W. 488.
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It was held in Rex Beach Pictures Co. v. Harry I. Garson
Productions5" that a foreign corporation was doing business
in another state when it marketed its own motion pictures
through the local distributors, who acquired no title to the
films consigned to them under the contract; the contracts made
by such consignees with various theaters in the state were
subject to the approval of the foreign corporation.
It has been held5" that the business of providing public
baseball games for profit between clubs of professional ball
players in a league and between clubs of rival leagues, although
necessarily involving the constantly repeated traveling of the
players from one state to another, provided for, controlled
and disciplined by the organizations employing them, was not
interstate commerce. It was stated that: "The business is
giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely state affairs.
* * * the transport (across state lines) is a mere incident,
not the essential thing. * * * personal effort, not related
to production, is not a subject of commerce."
While some states6" have held that foreign corporations
conducting correspondence schools within the state were doing
business, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled
otherwise, holding such business to constitute interstate com-
merce outside the realm of state control and regulation. Thus
in International Textbook Co. v. Pigy, 61 which decision re-
versed the finding of the Kansas Supreme Court (76 Kan.
328), Mr. Justice Harlan stated: "Intercourse of that kind,
between parties in different States-particularly when it is in
execution of a valid contract between them-is as much inter-
course, in the constitutional sense, as intercourse by means of
the telegraph. * * * If intercourse between persons in
different states by means of telegraphic messages conveying
intelligence or information is commerce among the States,
58 (1920), 209 Mich. 692, 177 N. W. 254.
59 Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l. League etc. (1922), 259 U. S. 200, 208, 42 S.
Crt. 465.
60 Illinois (149 III. App. 509) ; Kansas (76 Kan. 328, 91 Pac. 74-reversed
in 217 U. S. 91, 30 S. Crt. 481); Missouri (229 Mo. 397, 129 S. W. 922) ; New
York (67 Misc. 49, 124 N. Y. Supp. 603).
61 (1910), 217 U. S. 91, 106, 30 S. Crt 481.
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which no State may directly burden or unnecessarily encumber,
we cannot doubt that intercourse or communication between
persons in different States, by means of correspondence through
the mail, is commerce among the States within the meaning
of the Constitution, especially where, as here, such intercourse
and communication really relates to matters of regular,
continuous business and to the making of contracts and the
transportation of books, papers, etc., appertaining to such
business."
Some interesting problems involving state and federal
control have arisen as a result of the advent of the modern
system of radio broadcasting.
In Hoffman v. Carter6 2 a New York Broadcasting company
was sued in New Jersey by a citizen of the latter State, for
defamatory remarks originating in Pennsylvania and reaching
New Jersey by means of wires which the defendant leased;
the program was then broadcast over a station owned and
operated by a New Jersey subsidiary of the defendant. It
was held that the defendant was not doing business in such
a manner as to subject it to service of process in New Jersey.
In such a case it seems as though the parent-subsidiary
relationship alone should not suffice to make service of process
effective, provided that there is a preservation of the corporate
separation. It is manifest, though, that the foreign corporation
should be held to be doing business when it is actively engaged
in the operation of the local broadcasting facilities.
In the case of City of Itlanta v. Itlanta Journal Co.,63 the
City had imposed, by ordinance, an annual fee upon "local
broadcasters" whose facilities were used to advertise mer-
chandise or services of those doing business in the City, "to
the general public residents of the City of Atlanta and the
State of Georgia." The ordinance exempted radio stations
that leased or sold their entire time or facilities for broadcast-
ing or advertising matter brought to Atlanta by wire or wire-
less, and then rebroadcast from Atlanta, or for broadcasting
advertisements intended entirely for the benefit of persons
62 (1936), 117 N. J. L. 205, 187 At. 576.
63 (1938), 186 Ga. 734-, 198 S. E. 788.
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non-residents of Atlanta and the State of Georgia. The
particular broadcasting station. in Atlanta involved herein
devoted approximately two hours each day for the broad-
casting of local advertisements originating in its own studio;
all the revenue was procured through the ability of the station
to broadcast programs and advertisements which could be
heard both within and outside the State. It was found impos-
sible to restrict the station's messages so they would be received
solely by people within the State, or to effect such a limited
reception of programs emanating from the station. The
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the particular station was
not subject to the taxing fee.
It is interesting to note that in an earlier case in Georgia,64
where a college radio station was broadcasting commercial
programs (the income of which was insufficient to meet operat-
ing expenses), but devoted most of its time to educational and
self-sustaining programs, the taxing ordinance of the City of
Atlanta was held to be applicable, the court stating that:
"Even if it is true that some of its messages do go beyond the
State lines, that does not make it interstate business, especially
as there is nothing in the evidence to show that it has received
or will receive messages to be transmitted beyond the State
lines into another State. But even if it did receive such con-
tracts, its business is certainly almost altogether intrastate;
and its income is derived almost entirely, if not altogether,
from what might be called intrastate business."
The attitude of the federal courts relative to the imposition
of taxes on broadcasting, by municipal ordinances, was enun-
ciated in Whitehurst v. Grimes,65 wherein it was stated that:
"Radio communications are all interstate. This is so, though
they may be intended only for intrastate transmission; and
interstate transmission of such communications may be seri-
ously affected by communications intended only for intrastate
transmission. Such communications admit of and require a
uniform system of regulation and control throughout the
64 City of Atlanta v. Oglethorpe University (1934), 178 Ga. 379, 383, 173
S. E. 110.
65 (1927), 21 Fed. (2) 787.
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United States, and Congress has covered the field by appro-
priate legislation. It follows that the ordinance is void, as a
regulation of interstate commerce."
It is submitted that this last statement is consonant and
compatible with the contemporaneous viewpoint and trend in
the law which dictates that those things which affect interstate
commerce should themselves come under the federal regulation
and control of such commerce.
One authority66 is of the opinion that "a radio broadcasting
engaged in transmitting advertising programs from a station
in one state to persons in other states, who 'listen in' through
the use of receiving sets, does not differ in procedure from that
employed in sending messages by wire across state lines which
is interstate commerce and not subject to a state occupation
tax based on gross receipts."
Relative to single, occasional or isolated acts or transactions
of a foreign corporation within another state, the courts tend
to hold that the corporation must carry on some substantial
part of its ordinary corporate business, which must be con-
tinuous in the sense that it is distinguishable from merely
casual or occasional transactions; the business must be such
as to produce some form of a legal obligation. Generally, the
corporation cannot be said to be doing business, as concerns a
particular act, when it has no intention of repeating it, or of
making the local state a basis for the performance of any part
of its corporate business.
It is apposite at this point to devote some attention to a
few of the Indiana statutes and cases pertaining to the doing
of business by a foreign corporation.
It is interesting to note that the Indiana Corporation Act,6 7
as passed in 1929, requires each foreign corporation "admitted
to do business in this state" to keep on file in the office of
the Secretary of State an affidavit containing, among other
things, the name of the resident agent on whom service of
legal process may be had-the application for admission filed
by the foreign corporation is deemed to be such an affidavit.
66 Marchetti, LAw OF STAGE, SCREEN AND RADIo (1936), p. 388.
OT Burns Ind. Statutes Annotated, 1933, Sec. 25-306.
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But when the agent is removed or is in any way incapacitated,
the foreign corporation must file a new affidavit.
In 1939 the Indiana General Assembly enacted a statutory
provision 8 for service of process on corporations not admitted
to do business in the State. This statute provides, in sub-
stance, that the engaging "in any transaction or the doing
of any business" in the State by a foreign corporation not
previously licensed or admitted to do business therein, is
deemed equivalent to an appointment of the Secretary of
State as the true and lawful agent of the corporation upon
whom may be served all lawful processes, writs, etc., arising
out of any act or thing done by the corporation within the
State. Such circumstances or set of facts shall signify the
agreement of the corporation that any such process, writ,
etc., against it, which is so served, shall be of the same legal
force and effect as if it had been served upon a designated
resident agent of the corporation. Provisions are then made
for the mode of effecting such service.
It is obvious that the determination of what constitutes
"engaging in any transaction," or "the doing of any business,"
is requisite before the statute can be applied to any given
statement of facts.
In order to ascertain the attitude of the Indiana courts
relative to what constitutes doing business, a review of a few
of the cases pertaining to the subject will serve by way of
elucidation.
In Lowenmeyer v. Natl. Lumber Co. 9 a foreign corpora-
tion purchased real estate for use as a coal yard and so used
the same in conducting a retail coal business within the State.
The court held that such purchase of real estate was not
an isolated transaction, and therefore fell within the prohibi-
tion against doing business. The court, through Judge Bat-
man, said: "Such question, therefore, is ordinarily a matter
of judicial determination. The courts as a rule have held
that, where a foreign corporation enters into a single contract,
or engages in some other isolated business act within a par-
68 Ibid., Sec. 25-316.
69 (1919), 71 Ind. App. 458, 464, 125 N. E. 67.
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ticular state, with no intention to repeat the same therein,
or make such state a basis for the conduct of any part of its
corporate business, such corporation cannot be said to be
'doing business' or 'transacting business' within such state,
within the meaning of the usual statutory provisions regu-
lating the transaction of business by foreign corporations.
* * * In the instant case, however, it is evident that the
act of purchasing the real estate in question does not fall
within that class of cases denominated isolated transactions."
The case of North Dakota Realty etc. Co. v. Abel et al.70
involved a situation wherein a foreign corporation took a
conveyance of a house and lot in Indiana as part payment for
certain land which it then owned in North Dakota; and sub-
sequently, for the purpose of disposing of the Indiana prop-
erty, sold it and received therefor a certain amount in cash
and a mortgage on other Indiana lots; when the owner of
the lots was unable to pay the mortgage, the fee thereof was
transferred to the foreign corporation, all of the business
being transacted in another state. In holding that the cor-
poration was not "transacting business" in Indiana, the court
followed the Lowenmeyer Case.
Where a Florida corporation, organized to buy, sell and
lease real estate, to collect rents, and to cultivate lands for
agricultural purposes, took possession of Indiana land, rented
some of it, and made hay and in other ways cultivated por-
tions of it, the court held that the acquisition of the land and
the cultivation thereof constituted a continuing act, and "if
appellee (the foreign corporation) was not transacting busi-
ness within the state, then it must be that farming is not a
business." 71
In the "sale and installation" contracts by a foreign cor-
poration, the Indiana courts are, on the whole, in accord with
the majority rule on the proposition.
There was no interstate commerce, but rather the trans-
action of local business, in U. S. Construction Co. v. Hamilton
70 (1927), 85 Ind. App. 563, 155 N. E. 46.
71 Burroughs v. Southern Colonization Co. (1928), - Ind. App. -, 163
N. E. 517, 521.
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National Bank.7 2  In that case a foreign corporation con-
tracted to equip an Indianapolis manufacturing plant with a
sprinkler system, which required the employment of labor
for weeks in such construction, involving the building of a
tower, a tank and other carpenter work, and the excavating
and filling of trenches, with the use of material which was
on the ground of, and the property of, the manufacturing
company. The decision reached therein was predicated upon
the case of Browning v. Waycross73 the court saying: "* * *
we hold that the contract and transaction involved in this
action was not interstate commerce, but that it was the trans-
action of local business in the state * * *."
It was held in Filter Mfg. Co. v. Evans74 that where a
foreign corporation sells an ammonia compressor and other
large and heavy machinery connected therewith to a dairy
company in Indiana, and agrees to install such machinery,
it is engaged in interstate commerce, and thus is not subject
to the statute requiring registration as a prerequisite to a
foreign corporation's doing business within the State, even-
though local laborers are employed as a means of effecting
the installation of the equipment sold. The court distin-
guished that case from that of U. S. Construction Co. v.
Hamilton National Bank75 by pointing out that the work in
the latter case "required the employment of labor for weeks
in such construction, required the building of a tower, a tank,
and other carpenter work, and the excavating and filling of
trenches, with the use of material which was on the ground
of, and the property of, the manuafcturing company, while,
in the contract here involved, there was a simple sale of an
ammonia compressor, and machinery and apparatus appur-
tenant thereto, with an agreement to install the same. * * *
All of the work done was involved in the sale, and did not,
as in the United States Construction Company case, involve
digging trenches, erecting buildings," etc. To support its
72 (1920), 73 Ind. App. 149, 158, 126 N. E. 866.
73 Supra, footnote 53.
74 (1927), 86 Ind. App. 144, 154 N. E. 677.
75 Supra, footnote 72, p. 147.
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conclusion, the court quoted from Browning v. WVaycross, 76
wherein it was said: "Of course, we are not called upon here
to consider how far interstate commerce might be held to
continue to apply to an article shipped from one state to
another, after delivery and up to and including the time when
the article was put together or made operative in the place
of destination in a case where, because of some intrinsic and
peculiar quality or inherent complexity of the article,, the
making of such agreement was essential to the accomplishment
of the interstate transaction."
Various cases have arisen in Indiana concerning the power
of municipalities to exercise their jurisdiction over itinerant
peddlers.
The earliest of these cases was that of McLaughlin v. The
City of South Bend.77  There it was held that an ordinance
prohibiting traveling merchants or peddlers from selling, or
offering to sell, any merchandise without having obtained a
license, could not be enforced against a person who solicited
orders for books which were in Illinois and were to be shipped
to the customer in Indiana; the court felt that the ordinance
in effect assumed to establish a regulation affecting commerce
between the states.
This case was followed in Martin v. Town of Rosedale78
wherein a similar ordinance was held to be void, on the same
ground, as concerned non-residents engaged in selling, by
samples, goods located in Illinois. In quoting from the
McLaughlin Case it was said: "The negotiations concerned
goods in another State, there owned and held for sale, and
such negotiation must be regarded as affecting interstate com-
merce, and, thus regarded, it must be held that they can
neither be prohibited nor regulated by the state or its munici-
palities."
The principles enunciated in these two cases were cited and
applied to a similar case wherein the salesman solicited orders,
by samples, for men's clothing.79
76 Supra, footnote 53.
77 (1890), 126 Ind. 471, 28 N. E. 185.
78 (1891), 130 Ind. 109, 112, 29 N. E. 410.
79 City of Rushville v. Heynernan (1917), 186 Ind. 1, 114 N. E. 691.
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A different result was reached in Town of Sellersburg v.
Stanforth.80 In that case the defendant was accustomed to
solicit orders for groceries at the homes of his customers, and
then to fill them with goods purchased in bulk from a Ken-
tucky corporation, making his own deliveries, and the cor-
poration looked only to the defendant for the purchase price
of the merchandise. The municipal ordinance requiring the
licensing of peddlers of merchandise was held applicable as
concerned the defendant, the court saying: "If the appellee
(defendant) became the owner of the goods in bulk when he
received them from the company at its office it necessarily
follows that he solicited purchasers of his own goods and
was conducting a strictly intrastate business as a peddler.
The fact that he took orders and then purchased the goods
to fill the orders from a foreign vendor would not change
the fact that his business was that of an itinerant retailer,
whose method of doing business brought him within the pur-
view of the ordinance and made him subject to the police
regulations therein. * * * But if, as apparently found by
the trial court, the defendant, throughout the entire trans-
action was acting as the agent of The Great American Tea
Company then the company itself was engaging in intrastate
business in Indiana through the medium of the peddling of
the defendant."
The statute appertaining to foreign corporations doing
business in Indiana was held inapplicable in Mutual Mfg.
Co. v. Alpaugh,1 where the business transacted was the tak-
ing of orders in Indiana by salesmen of an Arizona corpora-
tion, for goods manufactured in Ohio, in which latter State
delivery and payment were to be made also.
Peter & Burghard Stone Co. v. Carper8" pertained to a
foreign corporation which made a contract in Indiana, and
pursuant thereto transacted business within the State by fur-
nishing material and labor in the construction of a building
therein, before the corporation had complied with the statute
80 (1935), 209 Ind. 229, 235, 198 N. E. 437.
81 (1910), 174- Ind. 381, 91 N. E. 504.
82 (1930), 96 Ind. App. 554, 172 N. E. 319.
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regulating the admission of foreign corporations to the State.
The court held that, upon subsequent compliance with the
statute, the corporation could prosecute an action in Indiana
to recover the contract price for the material and labor; since
the contract was not void. It should be noted that this case
overruled U. S. Construction Co. v. Hamilton National Bank 3
so far as the latter conflicted with the instant decision.
While it is apparent that no precise definition of "doing
business" can be obtained, so as to be applicable and per-
tinent to each and every situation concerning the problem,
yet various courts have attempted to define the term.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has stated that: "Taking
the language ('to do business') in its ordinary acceptation,
a corporation does business by the exercise of its power to
contract, its power to acquire and hold property, real and
personal, and like powers. By the exercise of these corporate
powers, it carries on its corporate business in the ordinary
meaning of the term. By their exercise it establishes its
business relations, assumes obligations, and acquires rights. '8 4
In Wilson v. Jetmore First State Bank"5 it was said: "The
only rational meaning of 'doing business' is the carrying on
of the operations of the corporation, or some portion of
them, in the usual and regular course of the prosecution of
the corporate enterprise for profit. Corporations are or-
ganized to run, not for the purpose of being brought to an
end, and it is the ordinary display of corporate life which the
statute covers, not the necessary functions attending corporate
extinction. * * * The words 'doing business' mean the
same whether the corporation be domestic or foreign."
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 6 has stated that: "Sec-
tion 9625, in using the term 'doing business in another county,'
implies a continuity of conduct in that respect, such as might
be evidenced by the investment of capital and with the main-
tenance of an office or place for the transaction of business,
83 Supra, footnote 72.
84 Utley v. Clark-Gardner Lode Min. Co. (1878), 4 Colo. 369, 372.
85 (1908), 77 Kan. 589, 595, 95 Pac. 404.
86 Standard Paving Co. v. County Brd. of Equalization (1928), 135 Okla. 15,
21, 273 Pac. 201.
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and those incidental circumstances which disclose and attest
an intent on the part of the corporation or individual to
avail itself of the privilege of carrying on a business there,
such as will result in a portion of its property being incor-
porated in the bulk of the property of the county, and used
for some substantial period of time in such a manner as other
property of like character of the local taxing district is used."
In the case of Shambe v. Delaware & H. R. R. Co.87 it
was held that: "The essential elements which constitute 'doing
business,' as required by our laws, are the same as those neces-
sary under the due process clause of the federal Constitution.
We must ascertain if the following requisite essentials appear
in this case: (1) The company must be present in the State,
(2) by an agent, * * * (3) duly authorized to repre-
sent it in the state; * * * (4) the business transacted
therein must be by or through such agent, * * * (5) the
business engaged in must be sufficient in quantity and quality;
* * * (6) there must be a statute making such corpora-
tions amenable to suit * * *. The term 'quality of acts'
means those directly, furthering or essential to, corporate
objects; they do not include incidental acts. * * * By
'quantity of acts' is meant those which are so continuous and
sufficient to be termed general or habitual. A single act is
not enough. * * * Each case must depend upon its own
facts, and must show that the essential requirement of juris-
diction has been complied with."
After a consideration of these attempted and abortive
definitions, it is manifest that it is difficult and perhaps im-
possible to determine whether a foreign corporation is doing
business within a state such as would subject it to regulation
and control therein. The obvious lack of harmony among
the decisions of the various courts might be attributable, to
some extent, to the fact that the pertinent statutes of the
several states differ in their phraseology, and thereby admit
of different constructions and interpretations.
87 (1927), 288 Pa. 240, 246, 135 AtI. 755.
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Since the question is one of fact, it is to be determined
largely according to the facts of each individual case, rather
than by the application of fixed, definite and precise rules.
It was stated by Mr. Justice Day, in St. Louis S. W. Ry.
Co. v. Alexander,I' that: "This court has decided each case
of this character (whether a foreign corporation is doing
business within the district in such a sense as to subject it
to suit therein) upon the facts brought before it and has laid
down no all-embracing rule by which it may be determined
what constitutes the doing of business by a foreign corpora-
tion in such manner as to subject it to a given jurisdiction.
In a general way it may be said that the business must be such
in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the
corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of
the district in which it is served and in which it is bound to
appear when a proper agent has been served with process."
88 (1913), 227 U. S. 218, 227, 33 S. Crt. 245.
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